

HUMANE GLOBALIZATION? THE CLASH OF HUMAN RIGHTS
AND GLOBALIZATION AGENDAS IN THE QUEST FOR DEVELOPMENT

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Abstract

Two post-Cold War agendas competing for global policy hegemony are human rights and globalization. To enforce one agenda is to compromise the other, at least in theory. In practice, though, the two agendas could well be reinforcing. Can political and economic development proceed with attention paid to both human rights concerns and the economic growth promised by globalization advocates? Or do both in concert (or separately) do harm to the development cause? I perform quantitative tests to help answer these questions. I create an extensive cross-national, over-time dataset with quantitative measures of human rights, globalization, political (democratic) development, and economic development, using appropriate control variables in a multi-equation research design. The results indicate that both globalization and human rights can work together to increase economic and political development.

Introduction

Two agendas competing in the post-Cold War world for global policy hegemony are globalization and human rights. Each has its origins in centuries past, but both have a “modern” feel to them and distinguish themselves by their staying power and popularity. They are the subjects of conferences sponsored by the major IGOs (European Union, United Nations, World Bank) that are designed to better understand these phenomena and to harness their potential to better the quality of life. Whichever agenda “wins” the ideas competition will have the upper hand in shaping international sentiment on a whole host of important international issues, such as security regimes, environmental protection, and promotion of free trade. The fight is among and between foreign policy elites, and the increasingly powerful, media-savvy, and sometimes militant intelligensia. Assessing the contest between the two agendas and the progress that they have made toward hegemony is thus of some importance if we are to understand where power will lie in international relations discourse and praxis.

Both agendas have liberal idealist roots. If the liberal idealist “approach is based on abstract traditional foreign policy principles involving international norms, legal codes, and moral-ethical values” (Plano and Olton 1988, 7), then globalization and human rights both exhibit these principles. Globalization is “a structural shift in the spatial organization of socio-economic and political activity towards transcontinental or inter-regional patterns of relations, intersection and the exercise of power” (Goldblatt, Held, McGrew, and

Perraton 1999). Its economic aspect is defined further “in terms of total trade, imports from low wage economies, foreign direct investment, and financial market integration” (Garrett and Mitchell 2001, 145), or even more succinctly as “the international diffusion of commodities” (Richards, Gelleny and Sacko 2001, 220). Human rights is an umbrella concept which has underneath it “the prohibition of torture, the right to a fair trial and to equal protection under the law, freedom from arbitrary arrest, freedom of movement and residence, and freedom of thought, conscience, and religion” (Sørensen 1998, 90). These definitions all find a home in the liberal idealism literature.

Despite the theoretical congruence of globalization and human rights, their historical origins are quite different. One draws its legitimacy from the laissez-faire tradition (globalization), while the other lays its current hegemonic claim in international law (human rights). To enforce one agenda is to compromise the other, at least in theory. “If...human rights claims are the outcome of power relations, then in the current era all issues must be subordinated to the imperatives of globalization” (Evans 1998, 12).

In practice, though, the two agendas could very well be reinforcing. For instance, if tolerant societies are more open to international trade and interaction, then both globalization and respect for human rights increases. Western countries hoped that the spread of their values, free markets and democracy in the post-Cold War world, would raise the standards for human rights in developing countries (Woods 2000, 8). Conversely, in a more negative

sense, if one perceives both agendas to be dominated by Western ideologies, then resistance to globalization and the human rights agenda may harden.

Therefore, despite the apparent competition between the two agendas, there remains the possibility of a rapprochement. Can globalization and human rights co-exist as guides to countries engaged in the perpetual quest for political and economic development? Or does one agenda lose to the other in an evolutionary sense? Can political and economic development proceed with attention paid to both human rights concerns and the economic growth promised by globalization advocates? Or, as is suggested by a more radical perspective, do both in concert (or separately) do harm to the development/quality-of-life cause?

In this paper, I propose empirical, quantitative tests to help answer these questions. I create an extensive cross-national, over-time dataset of 116 countries, with annual quantitative measures of globalization, human rights, political (democratic) development, and economic development for the years 1990-1993. I test hypotheses based on the notion that these agendas could potentially co-exist in countries, using appropriate control variables in a multi-equation research design. My goal in this research is to capture the extent to which cross-national development can be better explained from either the globalization or the human rights perspective, or alternatively if both work to augment or hinder the development process.

Literature

Writings abound regarding globalization and human rights. Both literatures gained valuable momentum during the post-Cold War period, when communism, an ideology that favored neither globalization nor human rights, lost its grip on the old Second World countries. Several books acted as beacons for this period. Francis Fukuyama's *The End of History and the Last Man* (1992), while not necessarily advocating a globe consumed by either globalization or human rights, rejects the extreme and highly pessimistic left and right ideologies that characterized the Cold War battles, and asks for a post-Cold War world of liberal democracies that welcomes new ideas. Globalization and human rights have every potential to fill the ideological void. Works on globalization such as Thomas Friedman's *The Lexus and the Olive Tree* (1999) and Benjamin Barber's *Jihad vs. McWorld* (1996) became popular successes as they presented their respective, and quite different interpretations, of the phenomenon. There is controversy, as well, in writing about human rights, as seen in Jean Sasson's *Princess* (1992) and Michael Ondaatje's *Anil's Ghost* (2000). Films such as *The Killing Fields* also vividly depict human rights issues. Human rights writers have gained a great deal of publicity for their cause through their highly visible, country-by-country reporting of atrocities through such outlets as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. These reports are regularly quoted in the media as authoritative sources of information about the state of human rights in countries around the globe.

Globalization

The globalization literature is voluminous. Its volume, though, does not mean that it receives uniform respect from senior international relations scholars, especially from more extreme ideological positions.

I must say...that I do not like the word "globalization," because it implies that something new is going on which isn't new at all. What is going on right now is a cyclical process. We are going through the phase of capitalist traders trying to force open markets and tear down mercantilist barriers that various states have erected. This has happened before and they succeeded for a while, but new barriers are being put up. We are living in one of those moments. So it is not new; I reject this entirely. It is not even more extensive than it was previously; many people have argued that statistically we were more globalized in the period roughly from 1900 to 1914 than we are today. What it is...is a mode of trying to prevent a decline in hegemony. (Wallerstein 2000, 4)

Others would argue that the word itself is a scattered word, a catch-all, and faddish to boot. Robert Keohane, in a 2000 essay, compares globalization to his and Joseph Nye's contention about a similar concept, interdependence, 20 years ago: "This vague phrase expresses a poorly understood but widespread feeling that the very nature of world politics is changing" (Keohane 2000, 104).

However, to examine the opposite side, "Globalization, in its modern form, started with the voyages of discovery [in the 'New World'] in the 15th century" (Valaskakis 1999, 153). If globalization is a fad, perhaps it is one of the longest-lasting on record. It is also slightly unfair to give the scattered and catch-all monikers to globalization. In fact, a consensus is rapidly being reached on how to define the concept. We can examine several sources to unearth the consensus. To take one, Chan and Scarritt (2001) find the three

“central dimensions” of globalization to be a rise in international trade, especially via multinational corporations; increased rapidity and content of information dissemination through technical advances in its transmission; and the expansion of international political, economic, and cultural regimes as seen in intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations. From another perspective, “A world in which we find ourselves increasingly living lives that are not contained within national boundaries, increasingly able to be aware of the fate of populations geographically distant from ourselves, and increasingly able to [*sic*] take action that will make a difference to the well-being of those populations, is a world in which the issue of global norms will be experienced even more keenly” (Jones and Caney 2001, 6).

There are, of course, different areas of emphasis within this broad definition. It also seems to be difficult to think of globalization in neutral terms. Globalization’s most ardent defenders postulate that it will help to affirm economic and political development where it already exists, through demands on the economic and political elite that the benefits of both be maintained, and that it will bring both economic and political development to those places that have yet to see it, through a similar demand process for the economic and political “good life.” (For globalization’s defenders, economic and political development signify free-market, wealth-creating capitalism and liberal democracy, respectively.) Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan’s words to the U.S. Senate Finance Committee this past April highlight the pro-globalization stance: “To most economists, the evidence is

impressively persuasive that the dramatic increase in world competition, a consequence of broadening trade flows, has fostered markedly higher standards of living for almost all countries" (Crustinger 2001).

Globalization's equally vociferous opponents express the fear that global economic, political, and especially cultural homogenization will result from globalization, and will usher in a cookie-cutter, one-size-fits-all form of economic, political, and cultural social constructs. The critics also sense that it is the large corporate entities, disinclined to establish "real" democracy, that have emerged victorious from what they view as globalization's inexorable march across the landscape. "The recent protests in Seattle and Washington against international economic institutions focused attention on the growing perception that crucial political decisions have escaped the hands of democratically accountable governments" (Lynch 2001, 91). Governments, fearful of reprisal from multinational corporations exiting their country or investors seeking a more favorable investment climate away from oversight, are discouraged from interfering in corporate market transactions on behalf of their citizens, allowing them "to fend for themselves in a global market place" (Weisskopf 2000, 34). Keohane, in his presidential address to the American Political Science Association, fundamentally argued that "institutions can foster exploitation or even oppression" (2001, 1). Some go further: "Globalization can be seen as an extension of the U.S. policy of Manifest Destiny; the capitalist equivalent of the Monroe Doctrine" (Schwab and Pollis 2000, 214).

Robert Gilpin (2000) has attempted to unify three major perspectives on globalization, which refine the simple pro- and anti-globalization dichotomy. Gilpin identifies the free market, populist, and communitarian perspectives. The free market perspective is the only one that wholeheartedly endorses globalization, and claims that globalization brings about both global prosperity and wealth equalization. Populists from the ideological far right and left, as well as communitarians from the left, argue respectively that globalization repeals state sovereignty and nationhood, and/or it leads to political authoritarianism where the multinational corporation rules and environmental waste is its by-product. The skeptics claim that globalization has given "the right of money to vote" (Martin and Schumann 1998, 69) exalted status over others who have, or do not possess at all, the right to vote. In reply, Garrett (2000) fails to find any evidence of a regulatory "race to the bottom" that supposedly affects countries seeking the presence of multinational corporations.

There are some serious non-economic implications to globalization, namely those that involve the environment and public health. The term "global warming" is instructive in this regard. The head of the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change reports that "global temperatures are rising nearly twice as fast as previously thought" (BBC 2001). No one on the globe is immune from the effects of global warming. There is an increasing environmental impact from the invasion of non-native plant and animal species. Kudzu in the American South, zebra mussels in the Great Lakes, and

the water hyacinth in South America waterways that doubles in size in 12 days and kills fish and boat traffic illustrates the environmental cost of species invasions from biological globalization (James 2001). The challenge to global public health from the globalized migration of disease is immense. Viruses that had been controlled through antibiotics were becoming resistant to those treatments, and could easily overtake vulnerable, poor populations. Strains of tuberculosis have returned to "at least 100 countries" (Garrett 2000, 577). "Public health in the twenty-first century will rise or fall...with the ultimate course of globalization. If the passage of time finds ever-widening wealth gaps, disappearing middle classes, international financial lawlessness, and still-rising individualism, the essential elements of public health will be imperiled, perhaps nonexistent, all over the world" (Garrett 2000, 582).

Human Rights

Human rights can be defined in a number of ways. One can simply refer to the Preamble and articles contained within the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948, for characteristics that are commonly recognized as part and parcel of the term "human rights." One can also come to a more succinct and summary definition. For instance, human rights can be "philosophically justifiable claims by people to certain conditions of existence and privileges and amenities" (Brown 2000, 4).

The UDHR has proven to be a very durable document of global moral guidance. While ineffective in preventing human rights abuses (it is a

resolution, not a treaty), its words retained their currency throughout the years, such that the world has seen an institutionalization of human rights norms (Donnelly 1998, 11-17). The UDHR is an explicit challenge to Westphalian notions of sovereignty. States are allowed, under Westphalian sovereignty, to treat their citizens in the way they see fit, with no interference from the governments of other countries. Broadly speaking, this principle is true. There is nothing in the UDHR that explicitly gives countries the right to violate the Westphalian norm of non-interference. Article 2, Section 7 of the UDHR prevents either the United Nations or the UN member countries from interfering “in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.”

The UDHR is a far-reaching document. Not only are “freedom froms” such as freedom from arbitrary arrest, independent and impartial tribunal, and torture emphasized in the UDHR, but also “freedom tos” such as freedom to proclaim a nationality, work, and an adequate standard of living have received a great amount of attention. Even the notion of non-interference in domestic matters on the part of states is under challenge today. “Independence did not mean that [states] were exempt from a generally accepted code of conduct, however....Restrictions on a state’s freedom of maneuver, arising from a common cannon [*sic*] of civilized behavior, were not considered to be a violation of independence” (Kegley and Raymond 2001, 190).

A series of actors operating at various levels of global leadership have, in fact, exposed how poorly countries have treated their citizens. These actors

include IGOs such as the United Nations Commission on Human Rights and the United Nations Development Programme, NGOs like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, and even UN member countries as exemplified by the Human Rights Policy Department (HRPD) of the United Kingdom Foreign & Commonwealth Office and the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DHR) of the United States' Department of State. Both the HRPD and the DHR publish annual reports on human rights in countries worldwide. In this endeavor, they are joined by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch.

The far-reaching nature and quickening ascendancy of human rights has not been met with universal assent. "To the realist, human rights are largely irrelevant to the national interest defined in terms of power. To the legal positivist, they present an archetypal example of actions solely within the domestic jurisdiction, and thus the sovereign prerogatives, of states" (Donnelly 2000, 71). Of course, not everyone is a realist or legal positivist, and can find human rights expressed in documents like the Declaration of Independence. The question then becomes one of enforcement of these rights. If "people have collective human rights, how do they enforce these outside the juridical personification of people by the state entity to which they owe allegiance?" (Baxi 1998, 112)

Globalization and Human Rights: Whither Development?

For some scholars, the debate is over: globalization has irreparably harmed human rights, because the conditions needed for globalization to succeed are incompatible with those needed for a human rights framework to

which is not merely paid lip service, but also followed through upon with enforceable law. Globalization has resulted in societal fragmentation, pitting ethnicity against ethnicity, as it breaks up civilizations and realigns them along the axes of capitalism and high technology, augmented by IGOs with mandates to weave peoples into a global society (Schwab and Pollis 2000).

While globalization may seem to be the more natural ally of economic development, and human rights the ally of political development, the roles may well be more nuanced. Amartya Sen's research, of which *Development as Freedom* (1999) is perhaps most representative, has struck a consistent note in its advocacy of granting rights to peoples, in that those rights result in enormous political and economic development payoff.

MODELS AND DATA

If globalization is truly incompatible with human rights in the cause for development, then one or the other will have influence on variance in political and economic development, but not both at the same time. However, if both globalization and human rights are compatible with development, then both will have their own independent impact on political and economic development.

The Basic Models

To test these hypotheses, I create models of political development (represented by a democracy variable) and economic development (represented by the variable Gross National Product per capita), and seek to explain variation in both variables with multivariate equations. These models

receive their inspiration from the economic development and democracy literature. I have estimated similar models in the past (Burkhart and Lewis-Beck 1994, Burkhart 2001). The economic development model has several standard variables (for reviews, see Barro 1997; Kurzman, Werum, and Burkhart 2001; Siermann 1998): human capital stock such as literacy rates, government expenditures that at lower levels can stimulate the economy but at higher levels can reduce business enterprise, initial levels of wealth, investment, political stability (too little of it cools business—in fact, political stability interacts with investment in that investment takes place in the majority in politically stable locations), and population growth (too much of it means too youthful a wage-earning population and not enough wealth created). Culturally, it has been an oft-repeated belief (but first formalized by Max Weber) that the Protestant work ethic, emphasizing efficiency and thrift and even giving religious privilege to those who succeed economically (the “elect” in Calvinist theology are economically successful people) has led to countries with an abundance of it within its population to have higher levels of economic development (Weber 1958). Conceptually, the economic development model looks like this:

Economic Development = f (Initial Level of Development, Investment, Investment x Political Stability, Population Growth, Literacy, Central Government Expenditure, Central Government Expenditure x World-System Position, Protestant Population)

(Central government expenditure, is conditioned by world-system position, defined below.)

The political development, or democracy, literature has its own fundamental variables. The most important of these is economic development, regularly a strong and performer in study after study, locked into a positive relationship with democracy (Lipset 1959; Cutright 1963; Jackman 1973; Bollen 1979; Bollen and Jackman 1985; Burkhart and Lewis-Beck 1994; Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub and Limongi 2000). To distill the various reasons for why this relationship holds, "a common idea is that increasing economic benefits for the masses intensify demands for the political benefits of democracy. Economic development can spread authority and democratic aspirations among a variety of people, thus fostering democracy" (Burkhart and Lewis-Beck 1994, 903). There is more to the models than raw wealth, however: where a country is placed within a world-system of global economic relations conditions the impact of wealth on democracy. "[T]he effects of economic development are fundamentally shaped by the country's position vis-à-vis the World-Economy" (Gonick and Rosh 1988, 195). Countries in the global economic core enjoy capital-intensive economies, where the key to growth is investment. Countries in the global economic non-core suffer from economies that are labor intensive, often extracting primary products for shipment and later manufacturing to the core countries. The difference in price between primary products and manufactured goods leaves non-core countries to wear an economic straitjacket that will hamper their economic development efforts.

Economic development is thus fundamentally different in the different global economic regions. As in other prominent economic development models, central government expenditure is meant to represent the degree to which there is economic freedom in the country; the larger the amount of the expenditure, the less capitalist the country's economy. However, this variable can capture the extent to which the country is socialist, by employing its squared term; a "mixed" economy that has both capitalist and social welfare state elements to it will display an inverted U-curve relationship to democracy (Brunk, Caldeira, and Lewis-Beck 1987; Burkhart 2000). Finally, Protestantism, which highlights the individual's personal relationship with his or her deity, provides a climate more favorable for the power of the individual over the collective of the state, and thus encourages democracy to flourish (Bollen 1979). Conceptually, the political development model looks like this:

$$\text{Democracy} = f(\text{Economic Development}, \text{Economic Development} \times \text{World-System Position}, \text{Central Government Expenditure}, \text{Central Government Expenditure}^2, \text{Protestant Population})$$

Adding Globalization and Human Rights

We can operationalize globalization and human rights and insert them into the conceptual models above. In previous work (Burkhart 2001), I have created a measure of globalization that attempts to encompass the three globalization dimensions (economic, cultural, and political) suggested by Chan and Scarritt (2001). The measure is an index of three components, taking advantage of readily available data. To represent the economic dimension of

globalization, I use foreign trade flows (exports + imports / GNP) and foreign direct investment per capita. Both trade and foreign direct investment gauge the degree to which countries have fallen under the spell of globalization. To represent the cultural dimension, I use the number of telephones per 100 citizens in the country. It indicates the advancement in the country of a global culture of advanced technology. Foreign trade flows are at some level a political decision, where politicians through either relaxing or constricting foreign trade are making policy. The international regime of free trade must be agreed to state by state. Therefore, the globalization index is constructed in the following manner, for 116 countries in the dataset, annually for years 1990-93:

$$\text{Globalization} = (X_{\text{phone}} + X_{\text{trade}} + X_{\text{FDI}}) / 3$$

Where

$$X_{\text{phone}} = (\text{telephones per 100 citizens}) / 68.7,$$

$$X_{\text{trade}} = ((\text{exports} + \text{imports}) / \text{GNP}) - .46 / 387.16,$$

and

$$X_{\text{FDI}} = (\text{foreign direct investment}) / 3607.10.$$

(The dividends of each index indicate the maximum score for telephones per 100 citizens, foreign trade, and foreign direct investment. The subtrahend .46 for the divisor in the X_{trade} formula indicates the minimum score on the (exports + imports) / GNP operation. The overall globalization index is logged to the base 10, in order to linearize the measure for multiple regression analysis.)

Human rights is computationally more straightforward, but also more subjective. The data are taken from the dataset constructed by Poe, Tate, and Camp-Keith (1999). These scholars code countries for human rights abuses, using both Amnesty International and U.S. State Department reports. I choose to use the Amnesty International-based coding, in order to avoid country-specific bias that is possible with the coding based on State Department reports. The Poe, Tate, and Camp-Keith measure is a five point ordinal scale. A country scoring one has “a healthy record of respect of personal integrity,” while a country scoring five is “a human rights disaster” (Poe and Tate 1994, 855). I have used this scale to good effect in estimating models of human rights abuses (Burkhart 2002). Below are the coding rules for each score, in full:

Score of 1: Countries [are] under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their views, and torture is rare or exceptional....Political murders are extremely rare.

Score of 2: There is a limited amount of imprisonment for nonviolent political activity. However, few persons are affected, torture and beating are exceptional....Political murder is rare.

Score of 3: There is extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of such imprisonment. Execution or other political murders and brutality may be common. Unlimited detention, with or without trial, for political views is accepted.

Score of 4: The practices of [level 3] are expanded to larger numbers. Murders, disappearances, are a common part of life....In spite of its generality, on this level terror affects primarily those who interest themselves in politics or ideas.

Score of 5: The terrors of [level 4] have been expanded to the whole population....The leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals (Poe and Tate 1994, 867).

I recode the variables, for readability sake, so that the highest score is the lowest, and the lowest score the highest.

Finally, I allow for the possibility of globalization and human rights to work in concert with one another by taking their multiplicative term, and using the result as an interaction effect in the model.

Thus, globalization and human rights are added to the conceptual models, which are now:

Economic Development = f (Initial Level of Development, Investment, Investment x Political Stability, Population Growth, Literacy, Central Government Expenditure, Central Government Expenditure x World-System Position, Protestant Population, Globalization, Human Rights, Globalization x Human Rights)

Democracy = f (Economic Development, Economic Development x World-System Position, Central Government Expenditure, Central Government Expenditure², Protestantism, Globalization, Human Rights, Globalization x Human Rights)

Measurement

The economic development variable is GNP per capita, logged to the base 10 to correct for skewness, and is taken from the U.S Arms Control and Disarmament Agency publication *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1996*. In the democracy model, it is multiplied by a country's world-system position (a dummy variable for semiperipheral and peripheral world-system position, taken from Burkhart and Lewis-Beck 1994, 908-09). The initial level of development is the logged GNP per capita score for 1990. Gross direct investment is measured as a percentage of GDP, as reported by various issues

of the UNDP publication *Human Development Report*. It is also multiplied by the standard deviation of the Freedom House democracy score from 1990-1995, operating under the hypothesis that investors are less likely to invest in a country if it is politically unstable. Population figures come from various issues of the United Nations *Statistical Yearbook*. Central government expenditure is expressed as a percentage of a country's GNP, and is taken from various editions of the *Human Development Report*. It is multiplied by a country's world-system position in the economic development model, and is squared in the democracy model. Democracy is measured by the country's annual additive score on the Freedom House "political rights" and "civil liberties" scales, where a score of two is equivalent to a dictatorship and a score of 14 equivalent to a democracy (Burkhart and Lewis Beck 1994, 907). Adult literacy percentage rate is measured by the *Human Development Report*, and is the ability of the country's population aged 15 and older to read and write a simple paragraph about their everyday lives. The percentage of the population Protestant is taken from Barrett's *World Christian Encyclopedia* (1982).

Methodology

The pooled dataset is unbalanced (the number of cross-sections are not the same at each time point), restricting the statistical software appropriate for this exercise. I use TSP Version 4.4 for model estimation. Since the pooled data are cross-sectionally dominant (80-116 countries and only four time points), I am less concerned with autocorrelation than I am with panel heteroskedasticity. The VARCOMP procedure in TSP is a GLS variance

components random effects estimator, which is an efficient estimator designed to alleviate panel heteroskedasticity. I employ it as the estimator of choice.

Results and Discussion

Following are the parameter estimates for the political and economic development models.

(Table 1 about here)

It is fairly plain, from the results, that model specification is crucial for a deeper sense of the impact of both globalization and human rights on economic development. In equation 1, globalization has by far the greater impact. It is statistically significant variable in its direct impact, whereas human rights is statistically insignificant. However, when the interaction term is entered in equation 2, human rights displays both a direct (greater respect for human rights leads to higher levels of economic development) and indirect (again, in the correct direction—greater globalization has a positive impact on economic development) impact on economic development, whereas the direct effect of globalization disappears. The benefits of globalization appear to be in evidence only with the presence of a tolerant human rights climate. If we are to believe the results of equation 2, we are led to the conclusion that securing human rights is worth the effort for countries if they wish not only to gain the benefits of globalization, but also to advance economically.

(Table 2 about here)

In contrast to economic development, the direct impact of globalization is much more evident than is the direct impact of human rights. The effects of

globalization are weak, though. The t-ratios are statistically significant, but at only the .10 level. Human rights fails to reach statistical significance in either equation. This may not be too surprising, upon further consideration, as democracy is a structural variable and human rights is a policy outcomes variable. The two are not as closely related as one may think. The bivariate correlation between human rights and democracy is only .57, $N = 584$. In fact, the issue may be one of modeling: human rights may well follow democracy, and not the other way around. A Granger causality test between democracy and human rights may be of help here, and will be pursued in future research.

The parameter estimates of the models in both Tables 1 and 2 are plausible, in that where the other independent variables are strongly statistically significant, they are signed in the theoretically correct direction. In the economic development model, initial economic development is a positive number, as is investment, and both make theoretical sense. As well, to analyze one of the key interaction terms in the economic development model, the more unstable the country, the lower the degree to which investment will have a positive return on economic development (coefficient signed negatively). In the democracy model, economic development has a familiar positive impact on democracy, in that the wealthier the country, the more likely it is that it is democratic. However, the interaction of economic development with world-system position suggests that countries outside of the core of the global economic system (the semiperipheral and peripheral countries) will have less of their development translated to democracy. A

Protestant country is more likely to be democratic as well, *ceteris paribus*.

That these models give empirical results that square with theories about the events of economic and political development lends further credence to our interpretation of the role of globalization and human rights in accounting for levels of development.

Conclusion

To quote the famous race in *Alice in Wonderland*, "But who has won?" The answer, in this albeit limited data environment, is that political and economic development are two different agendas. Democracy demands that globalization be present, while human rights need to be present both directly and as an aid to realizing globalization's potential in increasing economic development. Human rights seems to do neither special harm nor good in increasing levels of political development. Thus, human rights can be pursued for its own moral sake. What we can say is that, based on these results, human rights advocates should be cautious in "playing up" the side benefits for countries in establishing human rights. Globalization, as well, is not a terribly impressive force for global political change, either. Perhaps too much of a burden is placed on both concepts by modern-day observers who are expecting dramatic change in international relations.

Appendix: Countries in Dataset

Argentina*	Australia*	Austria*
Bahrain	Bangladesh*	Barbados
Belgium*	Belize	Bolivia*
Botswana	Brazil*	Burundi
Cameroon*	Canada	Cape Verde
Central African Republic	Chad*	Chile*
China*	Colombia*	Congo
Costa Rica*	Côte d'Ivoire*	Cyprus
Denmark*	Djibouti	Dominica
Dominican Republic*	Ecuador*	Egypt*
El Salvador*	Equatorial Guinea	Ethiopia
Fiji	Finland*	France*
Gabon*	Gambia	Germany*
Ghana	Greece*	Guatemala*
Guinea-Bissau*	Guyana	Haiti
Honduras	Hungary*	Iceland
India*	Indonesia*	Ireland*
Israel*	Italy*	Jamaica
Japan*	Jordan*	Kenya*
Korea (Rep.)*	Kuwait**	Laos
Madagascar*	Malawi*	Malaysia*
Mali*	Malta	Mauritania*
Mauritius*	Mexico*	Mongolia*
Morocco*	Mozambique	Myanmar*
Namibia*	Nepal*	Netherlands*
New Zealand*	Nicaragua*	Niger
Nigeria	Norway*	Oman*
Pakistan*	Panama*	Papua New Guinea*
Paraguay*	Peru*	Philippines*
Poland*	Portugal*	Romania*
Rwanda*	São Tomé and Príncipe	Saudi Arabia
Senegal	Sierra Leone*	Singapore*
South Africa*	Spain*	Sri Lanka*
Swaziland	Sweden*	Switzerland
Syria*	Tanzania	Thailand*
Togo	Trinidad and Tobago	Tunisia*
Turkey*	Uganda*	United Kingdom*
United States*	Uruguay*	Venezuela*
Zambia	Zimbabwe*	

* = country analyzed in both the economic development & democracy equations

** = country analyzed in the economic development equation only

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Table 1: Parameter Estimates for Economic Development Models

<u>Independent Variable</u>	<u>Equation 1— Dep. Var.: GNP Per Capita</u>	<u>Equation 2— Dep. Var.: GNP Per Capita</u>
Initial Economic Development	.95** (49.96)	.95** (49.88)
Gross Direct Investment	.04** (5.85)	.04** (5.85)
Gross Direct Investment x Political Stability	-.009** (2.02)	-.008** (1.90)
Population Growth	.001 (.17)	.001 (.23)
Adult Literacy Rate	.002 (.53)	.001 (.44)
Central Government Expenditure	-.006 (.94)	-.006 (1.05)
Semiperipheral World- System Position x Central Government Expenditure	-.0004 (.07)	.0009 (.17)
Peripheral World-System Position x Central Government Expenditure	-.001 (.15)	.0003 (.05)
Protestant Population	-.004 (1.22)	-.004* (1.34)
Globalization	.15** (3.48)	.04 (.59)
Human Rights	.03 (1.23)	.03** (2.26)
Globalization x Human Rights		.03** (2.04)
Constant	.24** (2.81)	.14* (1.44)
Adjusted R-Squared	.99	.99
Standard Error Estimate	.06	.06
Number of Cases	259	259

Where the variables are defined as in the text, () = absolute t-ratios, ** = statistical significance at the .05 level, one-tailed test, * = statistical significance at the .10 level, one-tailed test. Estimates generated by PANEL(VARCOMP) procedure in TSP 4.4.

Table 2: Parameter Estimates for Political Development Models

<u>Independent Variable</u>	<u>Equation 1— Dep. Var.: Democracy</u>	<u>Equation 2— Dep. Var.: Democracy</u>
Gross National Product Per Capita	1.14** (1.90)	1.15** (1.92)
GNP Per Capita x Semiperipheral World-System Position	-.23 (1.07)	-.24 (1.11)
GNP Per Capita x Peripheral World-System Position	-.81** (2.82)	-.83** (2.84)
Central Government Expenditure	.04 (.92)	.04 (.91)
Central Government Expenditure x Central Government Expenditure	-.0005 (.77)	-.005 (.77)
Protestant Population	.02* (1.33)	.02* (1.34)
Globalization	3.07** (1.72)	3.68* (1.38)
Human Rights	-.03 (.27)	-.17 (.38)
Globalization x Human Rights		-.17 (.31)
Constant	8.62** (2.63)	9.14** (2.48)
Adjusted R-Squared	.46	.46
Standard Error Estimate	2.54	2.54
Number of Cases	271	271

Where the variables are defined as in the text, () = absolute t-ratios, ** = statistical significance at the .05 level, one-tailed test, * = statistical significance at the .10 level, one-tailed test. Estimates generated by PANEL(VARCOMP) procedure in TSP 4.4.